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PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN EU AND AUSTRALIAN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW POLICY PROCESSES 
JAMES DAY* 
I INTRODUCTION 
The debate surrounding the reach of bilateral investment and free trade 
agreements is fierce and well covered. Investor-state dispute settlement 
(‘ISDS’) mechanisms, for instance, are characterised as anything from 
indefensible affronts on states’ ability to regulate to vitally important tools for 
encouraging foreign direct investment and facilitating economic growth.  
As international investment law policy (such as in regard to ISDS) becomes 
more divisive, the perception grows that it is an area administered almost 
exclusively by the executive arm of government; away from the legislature 
and out of the public eye. This is despite these policies crystallising into 
agreements that are felt heavily in the domestic spheres, where laws are open 
to challenge, treasuries open to appropriation and markets open to 
international competition.  
This perception is live in the EU and Australia, the subjects of this paper. The 
EU institutions face a public confidence that is at an all-time low, with a large 
part of this sentiment emanating from its investment law policy, whereas 
Australia has recently concluded a raft of free trade agreements (‘FTAs’) 
which are earning the ire of a people that are increasingly discontent with each 
one that is inked.  
The EU and Australia have been chosen for this comparison due to their 
unique and innovative positions on international investment law. The EU has 
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recently just proposed a major restructuring of the ISDS system to be adopted 
in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (‘TTIP’) and has just 
amended the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada to 
be in line with this proposal. Australia, meanwhile, stood almost alone six 
years ago in adopting a blanket refusal of ISDS provisions in their investment 
agreements and the recently-signed Transpacific Trade Partnership (‘TPP’) 
agreement includes an investment chapter containing a slew of innovative 
measures to protect the members’ right to regulate.1   
These decisions by Australia and the EU to take different stances on 
investment law are the outcome of democratic processes which are structured 
by legal frameworks. Lying at the heart of these legal frameworks is the 
democratic principle of participation of those people being represented. In the 
case of the EU, these are enshrined by article 11 of its ‘constitution’ (the 
Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’))2 which comprises three sub-principles: 
openness, inclusiveness and responsiveness. In contrast, Australia’s 
constitution only briefly sets out its legal framework as a representative 
democracy, which necessarily inherits elements of participation in its 
administration of government.  
So, in a field of law which is proving increasingly divisive and viewed as un-
participatory, the question is asked: which international investment law policy 
process lends more to principles of participation than the other?  
This question will be explored over the following comparative paper. That is: 
                                                 
1 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement between the Government of Australia and the 
Governments of: Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore, the United States of America and Vietnam, signed 4 February 2016 (yet to be 
ratified). Full text released by the Australian government at <www.dfat.gov.au>; for example 
see the specific industry carve-outs (art 9.9.3),  the ability to trigger state-to-state consultations 
(art 9.11.3),  the ability to make binding joint interpretations (art 9.22.3) and an explicit 
recognition that states can regulate to protect public welfare, health and environment (art 
9.15). 
2 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, open for signature 7 February 1992 
[2012] C 326/13 (entered into force 1 November 2013) Art 11.  
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1. how the international investment law policies are made, through which 
legal  structures, involving what stakeholders and through what 
forums; and  
2. how these processes compare to one another by reference to the 
participatory principles of openness, inclusiveness and responsiveness.  
Chapter I develops the idea of participatory democracy in the EU and 
Australia as the benchmark against which the two processes are measured. 
Chapter II examines the international investment law policy process of the EU 
and Chapter III does likewise for Australia. Particular focus will be put on the 
processes surrounding the TTIP and the TTP; two megaregional FTAs 
involving the EU and Australia that are currently in the process of being 
concluded. Chapter IV will assess these two subjects’ international investment 
law policy processes as against the principles of democratic participation and 
then compare the two processes against each other as to which is more 
participatory.  
II PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AS A BENCHMARK FOR COMPARISON  
Both the EU and Australia are representative democracies: systems of rule that 
embrace elected officials who have undertaken to ‘represent’ the interests and 
views of the citizens under the framework of the ‘rule of law’.3 One of the 
pillars of representative democracies is the principle of participation of those 
people being represented; this principle underpins the strand of democratic 
theory known as ‘participatory democracy’. 
Participatory democracy is one of a number of strands of democratic theory 
which are conceived as being variants of, or complements to, representative 
democracies. Representative systems require these complements because, 
although they provide the citizens with the power to freely choose their 
representatives, the involvement of the citizens is otherwise ‘sadly but 
                                                 
3 D Held Models of Democracy (Polity Press, vol 3, 2006) (‘Held’) 4. 
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inescapably limited in a large-scale, complex, densely populated society’.4  It 
is this realism, together with scepticism of a system which forms policy and 
law on the basis of the preferences of the majority (and leaves the rights of the 
few exposed), which requires other forms of democracies to come in and 
provide checks and balances to the representative system.5 
Participatory democratic theory is a relatively new strand (though can at its 
core be found in the formulation of democratic theory in Ancient Greece6) that 
is broadly based on the premises that: 
a) the freedoms and liberties espoused by liberal democratic theories must 
be contextualised by what liberties are actually tangible and can be 
achieved for everyday life; 
b) the state is ‘inescapably locked into the maintenance and reproduction 
of the inequalities of everyday life’ and it is therefore neither separate 
nor impartial; 
c) as a result, elections are insufficient to ensure accountability of the 
governing bodies; so 
d) the true way of ensuring accountability and maintaining liberty is with 
‘direct and continuous involvement of citizens in the regulation of 
society and state’.7 
Indeed, according to this theory, upon a higher degree of participation, people 
will be more likely to believe that state decisions are binding,8 develop a less 
                                                 
4 Ibid 85. 
5 J Uhr Deliberative Democracy in Australia: the changing place of parliament (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) (‘Uhr’) 10. 
6 For example, see the famous speech at Pericles’ Funeral in about 431BC: ‘We do not say 
that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business, we say that 
he has no business here at all’, referred to in Held above n 3, 14. 
7 Paraphrased from the theories of Macpherson and Pateman in Held above n 7, 209-214. 
8 Held above n 3, 212. 
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estranged view of the government and a more concerned view of the 
collective.9 
Participatory democratic processes are fundamental institutions in the EU and 
Australian systems of government for complementing the broader form of 
representative government. This is especially so in international investment 
law, an area that is increasingly being cited as undemocratic.  
 Participatory Democracy in the European Union 
The EU is perhaps at the forefront of participatory democracy, enshrining 
participation as a legal norm in article 11 of the TEU.  
The insertion of this provision in 2007 was a result of a gradual political and 
judicial development in the late 20th century, beginning with the perception 
that something more than just political representation was required to grant the 
governing body ‘legitimacy’ in its decision making.10 This concept of 
legitimacy, initially developed by Habermas in 1976, is a core one when 
discussing the EU’s political and legal evolution.11 With the incredible growth 
of international organisations following the Cold War, the previously held 
view that their legitimacy came from state consent was on shaky ground. Their 
actions were instead seen as requiring democratic justification which was 
insufficient.12  
It was said that one way this insufficiency could be addressed was through 
direct civic participation, which compensates for the lack of direct national 
                                                 
9 Ibid; C Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1970). 
10 A von Bogdandy ‘The European Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of 
Articles 9 to 12 EU Treaty for International Organizations’ (2012) 23.2 European Journal of 
International Law 315, 325-6. 
11 Habermas says that where a government is in a continuous state of change and breakdown 
in policy (a rationality crisis) and becomes more interventionist to its people to avoid a 
national crisis, it becomes unable to meet the demands of its people and it crosses the line 
away from democracy and into a more oppressive model of governing; finding itself in a 
legitimacy crisis. See J Habermas Legitimation Crisis (Heinemann, 1976) discussed in Held 
above n 3, 192-196. 
12 von Bogdandy above n 10, 320. 
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parliamentary control.13 As expressed in the ‘governance turn in EU-studies’,14 
if an organisation conducts itself in a transparent and responsive manner, it 
may be granted more democratic legitimacy in decision-making.15  
Consequently, articles 9 to 11 of the TEU, the core of this approach to 
European democratic legitimacy, were born. Article 9 lays down the principle 
of equality,16 article 10 explicitly characterises the EU as a representative 
democracy17 and article 11 is the enshrinement of European participatory 
democracy.18  
The inclusion of article 11 was the first acknowledgment  of ‘constitutional 
relevance’ of participatory and consultative practices at the institutional level 
and, with the prescriptive use of ‘shall’, signalled the end of the discretionary 
manner by which the previous practices were undertaken.19 Further, in 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Christian Marxsen ‘Participatory Democracy in Europe: Article 11 TEU and the Legitimacy 
of the European Union’ in F Fabbrini, E H Ballin, & H Somsen (Eds.) What Form of 
Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart Publishing, 2015) 151 
(‘Marxsen’) 152. 
15 Acar Kutay ‘Limits of Participatory Democracy in European Governance’ (2015) 21.6 
European Law Journal 803 (‘Kutay’) 806. 
16 Art. 9: ‘In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its 
citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.’ 
17 Art. 10(1): ‘The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.’ 
18   Article 11: 
1. The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas 
of Union action. 
2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with 
representative associations and civil society. 
3. The European Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in 
order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent. 
4. Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member 
States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework 
of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a 
legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. 
The procedures and conditions required for such a citizens' initiative shall be determined in 
accordance with the first paragraph of Article 24 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
19 A Alemanno ‘Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU Law Transparency, Participation 
and Democracy’ (2014) European Law Review 9. 
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creating a mechanism by which citizens can propose action, article 11(4) gave 
‘teeth’ to the right to participate and established the first ‘transnational, direct 
democratic tool’ in history.20 
The policy documents of the EU institutions, together with its commentary, 
illuminate democratic participation under article 11 as being comprised of 
three sub-principles:  
a) openness, which requires the participatory initiatives to be conducted 
in a transparent manner, which allows the public to access information 
on the input, process, outcome and also the motives of the institution;21 
b) inclusiveness, which requires the participatory initiatives to be 
available to general participation and public scrutiny, including as wide 
a cross-section of interests as possible,22 and avoiding the over-
influence of strong, organised groups;23  and  
c) responsiveness, which requires the EU to provide feedback on the 
result of the public input and how it will be used.24  
It is these three principles which have formed the basis of assessing and 
comparing just how participatory the international investment law policy 
processes of the EU and Australia are.   
 Participatory Democracy in Australia  
                                                 
20 Ibid 12. 
21 See European Commission, European Governance - A White Paper, 25 July 2001 
(Communication) COM (2001) 428 (‘2001 White Paper’) 10; European Commission, Plan-D 
for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate 13 October 2005, COM (2005) 494 (‘Plan-D’) 9; 
discussed in Marxsen above n 14, 154; von Bogdandy above n 10, 329. 
22 See 2001 White Paper above n 21, 17; European Commission, Towards a Reinforced 
Culture of Consultation and Dialogue – General Principles and Minimum Standards for 
Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, 11 December 2002, COM (2002) 704 
(‘Minimum Standards’) 17; discussed in Marxsen above n 14, 154. 
23 von Bogdandy above n 10, 329. 
24 See Plan-D above n 21, 19; Minimum Standards above n 22, 21; both discussed in Marxsen 
above n 14, 154. 
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Unlike the EU, Australia’s adherence to participatory principles is largely 
uncodified, Articles 7 and 24 of the Australian Constitution provide that the 
Australian system of government is a representative democracy, with two 
fundamental tenets: popular control of government and political equality.25  
As part of these two tenets lie a number of other values, that are not found in 
the Constitution, including the principle of participation of the people.26 As 
Professor Crawford states, one of the core values of democracy is ‘the right of 
all citizens to participate in the political life of their societies’.27 
In 2011, when the Australian Parliamentary Library published a research paper 
on citizens’ engagement in policy making,28 it championed participation not 
only on the ethical basis of being ‘the right thing to do’, but also as a useful 
tool for decision and policy-makers alike. Engaging with citizens provides 
governments with an opportunity to access expert knowledge and also educate 
people about the policies themselves.29  
Habermasian theories also made their way to Australian shores, however, and 
the principle reason for citizen participation therefore remains that of 
legitimising the policy decisions taken by the governing bodies (as in the 
EU).30 As one Australian commentator put it,  
 
public participation as an addition to representative processes may provide 
an antidote to national political elites or technocrats and also offer an 
                                                 
25 M Sawyer, N Abjorensen and P Larkin Australia: the State of Democracy (Federation Press, 
2009) (‘Sawyer’) 2. 
26 Ibid. 
27 James Crawford, International Law as an Open System: Selected Essays (Cameron May, 
2002) 39; discussed in Bryan Mercurio and Rebecca Laforgia, ‘Expanding Democracy: Why 
Australia Should Negotiate for Open and Transparent Dispute Settlement in Its Free Trade 
Agreements’ (2005) 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 485 (‘Mecurio and Laforgia’) 
509. 
28 Brenton Holmes ‘Citizens’ Engagement in Policymaking and the Design of Public Services’ 
(2011) 1 Parliament of Australia - Parliamentary Library (‘Holmes’). 
29 Ibid 4. 
30 Ibid. 
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effective way to overcome a citizen’s sense of futility and powerlessness 
in the face of these larger forces.31 
  
1 Participatory Democracy in International Affairs 
The need for participation is enhanced in regard to treaty-making in Australia, 
which is enacted exclusively by the executive arm of government.32 As the 
traditional litmus test of elections is not a feature of treaty-making in 
Australia, there is greater value placed on ‘open continuous participatory 
decision-making processes’.33  
An examination of Australia’s treaty-making came to a head in the mid-1990s 
with the landmark Trick or Treaty?34 report of the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional References Committee, which precipitated a number of reforms 
designed to strengthen the treaty-making process and give Parliament a greater 
role.35 Since these reforms, however, concerns have resurfaced and are often 
levelled towards the government for committing to international obligations 
outside the public eye and without any parliamentary involvement. In a text 
written by four leading Australian public international lawyers, for example, it 
was submitted that despite a number of reforms to address these since the 
1990s, ‘the modest role now played by parliament has done little in reality to 
reduce the democratic deficit that prompted the fears in the first place’.36 
The change of government in 2007 facilitated a number of further changes. In 
2009, the government commissioned a review of the administration of 
government, which concluded the following: 
                                                 
31 Ibid 15. 
32 Australian Constitution s 61. 
33 See Mercurio and Laforgia above n 27, 509, quoting Professor Steve Charnovitz. 
34 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Trick or 
Treaty? Commonwealth Power to Make and Implement Treaties (November 1995). 
35 Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee, Parliament of Australia, Blind 
Agreement: Reforming Australia’s Treaty-Making Process (June 2015) (‘Trade Committee 
Report’) 71. 
36 H Charlesworth, M Chiam, D Hovell, and G Williams, No Country is an Island: Australia 
and International Law (UNSW Press, 2006) 153. 
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We consider a final essential ingredient for high performance as a public service is the 
paramount principle of focusing on citizens in the formulation of policy advice. This can 
mean making sure that citizens’ or clients’ experiences of engaging with the program, 
service or regulation resulting from the policy intervention is at the forefront of the policy 
maker’s mind. This will involve, where possible, actively engaging citizens and 
stakeholders in the policy formulation process so that their perspectives and ideas are taken 
into account.37 
Yet, if there are plenty of governmental statements committing to public 
participation and engagement, the extent to which the rhetoric matches reality 
is more obscure.38 This paper examines this question. 
The sub-principles of participatory democracy based on article 11 of the TEU, 
of openness, inclusiveness and responsiveness, are used as the benchmark to 
assess and compare the features of both the EU’s and Australia’s international 
investment law policy processes. They are used to assess Australia’s process 
as well, as it provides an instructive method of comparison where it does not 
itself have a codified participatory democratic norm, as the EU does in article 
11.  
III EUROPEAN UNION 
EU investment law policy is facing challenges. In light of the ‘earthquake’ 
election of late 2014, which now sees anti-establishment parties holding over 
200 of the 751 seats in the Parliament,39 there are real changes being 
necessitated in the decision-making process. Indeed, since the elections, EU 
Council President van Rompuy has issued a memorandum to other Heads of 
Government, believing that they should limit policy ambitions on the TTIP 
and ‘not take on policy that can be better handled by individual states’ due to 
the difficulty it will face in ratifying it.40  As one commentator stated, the 
                                                 
37 Terry Moran, Building the World’s Best Public Service (2009) 20. 
38 Holmes above n 27, 18. 
39 P Hugg and S Wilkinson ‘The 2014 European Parliament Elections and the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership: Economics and Politics Collide’ (2015) 24 Journal of 
Transnational Law & Policy 117, 119-124. 
40 Ibid 146. 
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TTIP ‘remains a fragile creature, at the mercy of politicians and public 
opinion’.41 
In light of this anti-EU sentiment in the international investment law space, it 
is perhaps even more important to facilitate participation in the policy process. 
This chapter analyses the processes for how international investment law 
policies are made and outlines the participatory initiatives in these processes.  
 Process Generally 
At a starting point, as the EU is not a nation state, but rather an international 
organisation (or staatenverbund42), the institutions of the EU are only able to 
take action in an area that is conferred to it by the EU Treaties.43  
The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the European Treaties, widened the areas that 
conferred the EU exclusive competence, including over the ‘common 
commercial policy’ on foreign direct investment.44  This includes the exclusive 
competence to negotiate and conclude agreements with the traditional 
substantive provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties (‘BITs’) and FTAs 
(such as ISDS guarantees).45 These agreements bind all of the EU member 
states.  
The European Parliament, Council of the EU (‘Council’) and European 
Commission (‘Commission’) contribute the most to the international 
investment law policy process.  
                                                 
41 Benjamin Fox, ‘From Trade Tariffs to Trust - TTIP a Year on’ EU Observer, July 28, 2014; 
Referred to in ibid 158. 
42 See decision of the German Constitutional Court in Roquette Frères v. Council [1980] ECR 
3333; Ferri, Delia ‘European Citizens … Mind the Gap ! Some Reflections on Participatory 
Democracy in the EU’ (2013) 5.3  Perspectives on Federalism 56 (‘Ferri’) 61. 
43 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992 
[2009] OJ C 115/199 (entered into force 1 November 1993) (‘TFEU’) art 2(1). 
44 Ibid art 207(1). 
45 August Reinisch ‘The EU on the Investment Path - Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU 
BITs and Other Investment Agreements’ (2013) 12 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 
111 (‘Reinisch’) 116. This interpretation of ‘foreign direct investment’ is that of the European 
Commission, though is subject to fierce debate. 
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First, the Parliament, comprised of directly-elected members, must pass any 
BIT or FTA and any legislation required to implement them.46 In addition to 
having to agree to its final text, the Commission is required to keep the 
Parliament fully informed at all times of negotiations47 and the Parliament 
itself may also take formal votes on the progress of, and make 
recommendations on, the negotiations of the agreement.  
Second, the Council must give unanimous assent to any investment acts that 
are proposed to it, including BITs and FTAs. The Council is comprised of 
government representatives of the EU member states; the extent of the 
member states’ formal involvement in the process.48 The elected officials of 
the Parliament and the member state-representatives in the Council form a 
‘double representation’ of the citizens, which has final say over any 
agreements.49 Under article 218 of the TFEU, the Council authorises the 
Commission to open negotiations, adopt directives on the negotiations, 
authorise the signing of and conclusion of the agreement.  
Finally, the Commission, particularly the Directorate General for Trade of the 
Commission (‘DG Trade’) oversees international trade and investment policy. 
DG Trade is led by the European Commissioner for Trade, currently Cecilia 
Malmström, who is voted into office by the Parliament. Article 17 of the TEU 
grants the Commission DG Trade (together with other Commission DGs) 
considerable powers as part of the executive branch of the EU. 
                                                 
46 These acts follow the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’. See TFEU, above n 43 art 207(1),(2) 
and 218(6)(a)(v). 
47 TFEU above n43 art 207(4).  
48 They do however retain the right to review proposed EU legislation with respect to 
proportionality and subsidiarity and may challenge the legislation before the Court of Justice 
of the EU on these grounds. See the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the 
European Union, CIG 14/07, TL/P/en 2 (3 December 2007); Protocol on the Application of 
the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, CIG 14/07, TL/P/en (6, December 3 2007). 
49 Cheneval, F. ‘The Case for Demoicracy in the EU’ in EUSA Conference Boston, March 
2011, 18. This argument is strongly debated, however, with many of commentators suggesting 
the external powers of the EU contributes to the crisis of democratic legitimacy in the EU. 
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 Participatory Initiatives 
The EU has established a number of initiatives that increase the participation 
of its citizens in the international investment law policy process. The main 
initiatives are managed by the Commission, predominantly through 
consultations, dialogues and specific transparency initiatives. There are other 
initiatives managed outside the Commission, through the Parliament, the 
Ombudsman and at a non-institutional level.   
1 Commission-based initiatives  
(a) Consultations  
Perhaps the most advanced participatory initiative of the Commission is its 
stakeholder consultations, performed in discharge of their obligations under 
article 11(3) of the TEU. Defined as the processes taken ‘to trigger input from 
outside interest parties for the shaping of policy prior to a decision’ being 
made and subject to minimum standards,50 these processes are predominantly 
pushed online through their platform Your Voice in Europe.51 Consultations 
are published online, where citizens and stakeholder groups are invited to 
complete an online questionnaire (either multiple choice or more substantive 
responses). In some cases the Commission asks for written submissions to a 
hearing.52 Although no citizens are excluded, in practice if not published as a 
‘public consultation’, they are usually targeted towards specific stakeholder 
groups.  
A number of consultations have been conducted by the Commission on 
specific questions of international trade and investment policy, including in 
                                                 
50 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Towards a reinforced 
culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for 
consultation of interested parties by the Commission, COM(2002) 704, 15-16 and generally.  
51 European Commission, Your Voice in Europe (2014) <http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/> . 
52 Christian Marxsen ‘Open Stakeholder Consultations at the European Level- Voice of the 
Citizens?’ (2015) 21.2 European Law Journal 257 (‘Marxsen’) 262. 
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regard to trade relations with Japan, China the US, Thailand, Myanmar and 
Morocco.53  
DG Trade also held a public consultation specifically on ISDS in the TTIP 
from March through July 2014 and received easily the highest level of 
participants out of any consultation.54 The consultation outlined a possible EU 
approach and sought feedback on the same. A text outlining the ISDS 
mechanism in the EU-Canada agreement was provided to illustrate the 
approach. According to the Commission’s report, four areas of concern were 
raised on ISDS in the TTIP:  
1. the protection of the right to regulate; 
2. the establishment and functioning of arbitral tribunals; 
3. the relationship between domestic judicial systems and ISDS; and 
4. the review of ISDS decisions through an appellate mechanism.55 
Following the consultation, the Commission issued a ‘concept paper’, 
addressing these concerns for the purpose of discussion with the Parliament 
and the Council.56 According to this paper, the Commission used the outcome 
of the TTIP consultations in developing its negotiating position (discussed 
below).57  
(b) Citizens Dialogue  
Since March 2014, the Commission has undertaken ‘citizens’ dialogues’, an 
initiative akin to a ‘town-hall meeting’ to give the public opportunities to raise 
their concerns and challenge the European Commissioners on any relevant 
                                                 
53 European Commission, Consultations, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/> . 
54 See European Commission, Report – Online public consultation on investment protection 
and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), SWD(2015), 13 January 2015 (Report on ISDS Consultation’) 2-4 
55 Ibid 4. 
56 Directorate- General for Trade of the European Commission, Investment in TTIP and 
beyond – the Path for Reform (2015) (‘Concept Paper on TTIP’). 
57 Ibid 3. 
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issues that are important to them. These were started in a bid to regain the 
citizens’ trust that has been steadily declining since the global financial 
crisis.58  
This approach has been continued under the new Trade Commissioner 
Malmström. On 3 December 2015, for example, Commissioner Malmström 
keynoted a citizens dialogue, titled TTIP, CETA, TiSA – What does the new 
trade strategy bring for Europe?, in which she clearly pointed to transparency 
as being a fundamental in TTIP negotiations.59 
(c) Transparency Register  
The Transparency Register was set up in 2011 to allow organisation 
stakeholders to get informed and ask fundamental questions of the EU, such as 
what interests are being represented, who is representing these interests and on 
what budget.60 
(d) Civil Society Dialogues  
In addition to the citizens’ dialogues, another similar initiative is its Civil 
Society Dialogues. DG Trade created these in 1998 in order to exchange views 
on policy and related topical issues.61 These dialogues consist of meetings 
                                                 
58 European Commission, Citizens’ Dialogues as a Contribution to Developing a European 
Public Space: Report from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
(2014) 12. 
59 ‘So on transparency, the only liberal answer is: we need as much as possible. Access to 
information about the political process is essential for democracy to work. And that's why we 
have made TTIP the most open bilateral free trade negotiation in the world…Ladies and 
gentlemen, what all of these efforts show, I believe, is that it is possible to have an effective 
open trade policy that also safeguards democracy and is in line with European values ‘ See 
speech by Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Trade at Event at Friedrich Naumann 
Stiftung, Belin, ‘TTIP, CETA, TiSA – What does the new trade strategy bring for Europe?’ 3 
December 2015. 
60 European Commission, Transparency Register (2015) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/staticPage/displayStaticPage.do?locale=en&r
eference=WHY_TRANSPARENCY_REGISTER> ‘Why a transparency register?’. 
61 See generally DG Trade, Civil Society Dialogue, (European Union, 2011). 
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between DG Trade and civil society groups registered in the Transparency 
Register (above), usually together with industry experts on the given topic.  
There are also specific dialogues on the EU’s free trade and investment 
agreement negotiations. On 2 December 2015, for example, DG Trade held its 
6th dialogue on the progress of TTIP negotiations.62 
2 Non-Commission-Based Initiatives  
(a) European Citizens’ Initiative  
The European Citizens’ Initiative is a mechanism backed by article 11(4) of 
the TEU and thus enjoys constitutional character. It gives EU citizens the 
power to ‘take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the 
framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where 
citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of 
implementing the [EU] Treaties’.  
The procedure requires a group of citizens from at least seven Member States 
to form a citizens’ committee, register the initiative with the Commission and 
collect at least one million signatures within one year (from at least one 
quarter of Member States). Upon doing so, the Commission has three months 
to respond, setting out the action it intends to take (if any).63  
As of January 2016, there had been no initiatives in relation to investment law, 
trade law or the TTIP. There has, however, been an attempted initiative, STOP 
TTIP, whose registration was rejected by the Commission. In its reasons, the 
Commission said that it was unable to accept the initiative because it requested 
the Commission to not do something (not enter into negotiations on the TTIP) 
which is outside the framework for the initiatives given by Regulation 
                                                 
62 European Commission, Civil Society- Meetings 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/meetdetails.cfm?meet=11461>.   
63 Regulation 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (16 February 2011) L 
65/1. 
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211/2011.64 The STOP TTIP has since appealed this decision to the CJEU and 
has continued to garner support, attracting over 3,400,000 participants as at 
March 2016.65 
(b) Parliamentary Committees – INTA 
In addition to the Commission’s initiatives, there are Parliamentary processes 
which increase the participation of EU citizens. There is a permanent 
parliamentary standing Committee on International Trade (‘INTA’) which has 
purview over international investment law policy.66  
INTA, as all of the Parliamentary committees, holds public hearings with 
industry experts to discuss trade and investment issues. In 2015, the EU’s 
FTAs, the TTIP in particular, were a common thread in most of these hearings. 
These included hearings on the EU’s future trade and investment strategy 
generally, its trade and investment relationship with Australia and New 
Zealand, the potential benefits of the TTIP for Europeans, its challenges, its 
ISDS and the regulatory aspects and a joint hearing with the Committee on 
Industry, Research and Energy on the impact on it in regard to its discreet 
policy areas.67  
All of this public participation contributes to the workings of INTA, which 
make recommendations to the Commission and Parliament. In June 2015, it 
tabled a report in Parliament containing recommendations to the Commission 
on the TTIP negotiations (discussed further below).  
(c) European Economic and Social Committee 
                                                 
64 European Commission, Secretary General, Letter to Mr Michael Feller, Your request for 
registration of a proposed citizens' initiative entitled ‘STOP TTIP’, 10 September 2014. 
65 Stop TTIP <https://stop-ttip.org/>. 
66 European Parliament, INTA 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/inta/home.html>.   
67 See events listed and reported in the website above n66.  
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The principal formal involvement of civil society is channelled through the 
European Economic and Social Committee (‘EESC’). Created by the Treaty of 
Rome as an advisory body, the EESC has permanent legal character,68 
consisting of economic and social interest groups that are nominated by 
national governments and appointed by the Council. Article 304 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) requires the Parliament, 
Council and Commission to consult it, giving the EESC the right to participate 
in EU governance. It may also issue an opinion on its own initiative.69 Since 
2014, the EESC has issued four such opinions on investment law policy: one 
on the EU-Japan FTA70 and three concerning the TTIP.71  
In its 2014 opinion titled Transatlantic trade relations and the EESC's views 
on an enhanced cooperation and eventual EU-US FTA, the EESC stressed the 
importance of a transparent and inclusive dialogue with stakeholders 
throughout the process.72 
3 TTIP-Specific Initiatives 
Further to the initiatives discussed above, the Commission has also 
specifically adopted a number of initiatives to increase the citizen participation 
in the TTIP negotiations with the US.  
Since the 2014 elections, especially, DG Trade has prioritised transparency 
throughout the negotiation TTIP process. In an official communication to the 
Commission, the new Commissioner Malmström proposed a ‘Transparency 
Initiative’, to ‘increase transparency, and … win public trust and support for 
                                                 
68 TFEU above n 43 art 301-304. 
69 Ibid art 304. 
70 European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion, The role of civil society in the EU-
Japan FTA (15 October 2014) No. REX/389.  
71 European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion, Transatlantic trade relations and the 
EESC's views on an enhanced cooperation and eventual EU-US FTA (4 June 2014) No. 
REX/390  (‘TTIP Opinion’); European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion, TTIP and 
its impact on SMEs (2 July 2015) No. REX/433; European Economic and Social Committee, 
Opinion, Investor protection and investor to state dispute settlement in EU trade and 
investment agreements with third countries (27 May 2015) No. REX/411. 
72 TTIP Opinion 1 above n 71, 1.10. 
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the TTIP’, including to publish more texts and provide a broader level of 
access of negotiating documents to the members of parliament. 73 
There are now many more negotiating documents being made public than 
there were previously. Following each round of negotiations, a negotiation 
progress report74 and statement from the lead negotiator were subsequently 
released,75 together with factsheets, negotiating texts, proposals and position 
papers.76  
(a) TTIP Advisory group 
In January 2014, the Commission established a 14-member TTIP Advisory 
Group, made out of industry stakeholders and experts from the environment, 
health, consumer and workers’ interests sectors. The group consults the 
Commission on specific issues which it has expertise in. It is chaired by the 
EU’s chief negotiator on the TTIP.77  
As at February 2016, the group had held 23 meetings, reporting on each one of 
them. The reports indicate that ISDS was a frequently-discussed topic. These 
discussions were predominantly in the form of a Q&A session between the 
group members and the chair.78 As at February 2016, the meetings reported 
that the ISDS proposal had not yet been addressed in negotiations. 
                                                 
73 Commissioner Malmstrom, Communication to the Commission: concerning transparency in 
TTIP negotiations (25 November 2014) No. C(2014) 9052  2. 
74 European Commission, Report of the eleventh round of negotiations for the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership, 6 November 2015.  
75 European Commission, TTIP round 11 Statement by EU chief negotiator Ignacio Garcia 
Bercero, 23 October 2015. 
76 See DG Trade, Trade – negotiating texts in TTIP 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230>. 
77 See Press Release, European Commission, Expert group to advise European Commission on 
EU-US trade talks, 27 January 2014. 
78 For example see the discussion on the Commission’s proposal regarding ISDS in the TTIP 
and its meeting specifically addressing the investments chapter, where members raised their 
concerns to ISDS and the system proposed by the Commission, available at Transatlantic 
Trade & Investment Partnership Advisory Group, Expert meeting on investment issues: 
meeting report, 9 October 2015 <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-
events/#advisory-group>. 
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(b) European Ombudsman’s Inquiry   
The European Ombudsman was created under the Treaty of Maastricht and 
now, under article 228 of the TFEU, has the power inquire into 
maladministration of the EU institutions.  
On 29 July 2014, the Ombudsman began an inquiry on its own initiative into 
the transparency and accessibility of the TTIP negotiations under the 
Commission.79  
As part of this inquiry, the Ombudsman conducted a public consultation, 
where the ‘overwhelming majority’ of over 6,000 responses were that ‘the EU 
needs to be more transparent as regards TTIP, notably in relation to its 
contacts with business representatives’.80 
In concluding its inquiry, the Ombudsman made ten suggestions for the 
Commission to increase transparency of the TTIP negotiations.81 In response, 
the Commission said that it would consider the suggestions ‘but it will have to 
do this within the context of the overall approach to transparency that will be 
set out by the Commission over the months ahead, and to which this inquiry is 
a valid contribution’.82 
IV AUSTRALIA 
This area of law has also reached a flashpoint in Australia. This began in April 
2011, when the then Gillard-led government made waves in the international 
investment law space by becoming the first developed country to publicly 
                                                 
79 European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman closing her own-initiative 
inquiry OI/10/2014/RA concerning the European Commission, 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/58668/html.bookmark> . 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid, Conclusion. 
82 European Commission, Comments of the Commission on the European Ombudsman's own-
initiative inquiry 
(2015) Ref. OI/10/2014/RA . 
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discontinue its practice of agreeing to international agreements containing 
ISDS clauses.83  
Since then, the public discourse on ISDS has risen exponentially and societal 
discontent follows it. Indeed, statistics show that the media reporting of the 
issue is easily ten-fold what it was in 2011.84 This opposition to ISDS in 
Australia stems from an alliance of sorts between the political left, outraged by 
Phillips Morris’ allegations of expropriation of its investments by the 
government in enacting anti-tobacco legislation, and the economic right, 
sceptical of the economic advantages brought by preferential trade 
agreements.85  
The upshot of this has been an increase in public debate and deliberation on 
the issues surrounding Australia’s international investment law policy. This is 
reflected in this increased media coverage and also an increased number of 
parliamentary reviews on proposed laws like the ‘Anti-ISDS Bill’ and bilateral 
FTAs.86 
Australia’s policy processes need to accommodate for this increase in the 
public discourse and the government is well aware. This chapter looks at the 
participatory initiatives that may accommodate this increase in public 
participation.  
 Process Generally   
The power to enter into treaties is an exclusive right granted to the executive 
arm of government under section 61 of the Australian Constitution. The power 
                                                 
83 Australian Government, Trading Our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity April (2011) 14. 
84 See figure 1 in L Nottage ‘The Evolution of Foreign Investment Regulation, Treaties and 
Investor-State Arbitration in Australia’ (2015) University of Sydney; Legal Studies Research 
Paper No 15/97 9. 
85 L Nottage and J Kurtz ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration ‘Down Under’: Policy and Politics in 
Australia’ (2015) University of Sydney; Legal Studies Research Paper No 15/06 4. 
86 Ibid 18. 
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to implement and ratify treaties, however, rests with the legislative arm of 
government (the Parliament) under section 51(xxix). 
Consequently, the government negotiates and signs a treaty and Parliament 
passes any legislation required to ratify the treaty. Once a treaty is signed, it is 
tabled in Parliament with a National Interest Analysis on why Australia should 
be party to the treaty. The treaty is then open to parliamentary debate and 
considered by parliamentary committee(s). The committee provides a report 
for Parliament and may make recommendations for future courses of action.87 
The treaty must then pass both Houses of Parliament, together with any other 
legislation required for its implementation before any action is taken under the 
treaty.   
 Participatory Initiatives 
Participation in Australia’s international investment law policy process is 
facilitated through the executive arm of government and Parliament. Both of 
these two arms of Australian Government provide ample opportunity for 
citizen and specific stakeholder participation.  
1 Government Initiatives  
The Australian Government implements its international trade and investment 
policies through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (‘DFAT’). 
‘Promoting trade’ and ‘attracting investment’ form two of the four key pillars 
of the government’s ‘economic diplomacy agenda’; the cornerstone of its 
international foreign affairs policy.88 
In implementing this agenda, DFAT undertakes a number of initiatives that 
increase the citizen and stakeholder participation in its international 
investment law policy. 
                                                 
87 DFAT, Treaty making process <http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/treaties/treaty-
making-process/pages/treaty-making-process.aspx>.  
88 DFAT, Australia’s economic diplomacy <http://dfat.gov.au/trade/economic-
diplomacy/Pages/economic-diplomacy.aspx>.   
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(a) Consultations and Submissions Generally  
DFAT undertakes public and targeted consultations before entering into all of 
its international investment and trade agreements.89 According to the 
government, these ensure that the stakeholders’ views are essential to 
understanding the key commercial-level factors that are relevant to their 
negotiating priorities.90 
First, anyone is invited to make submissions on the relevant agreement 
generally or on a specific issue, in as much detail as they wish. Second, it 
holds specific consultations with state and territory governments, industry 
groups and businesses, NGOs, but also academics and citizens generally. They 
are advertised in the media and on DFAT’s website and are stated as forming 
the basis of the government’s position on whether such agreements are in the 
national interest and not ‘merely so that those with an interest feel included’.91 
They take the form of one-to-one meetings, group meetings, roundtables with 
industry representatives, professional bodies, or sector-specific stakeholders 
and public forums. In addition, in 2014 the government established a 20-
member Trade and Investment Policy Council to facilitate dialogue with the 
business community and ‘to contribute a commercial perspective to trade and 
investment policy’. The council is made out of industry experts across the 
main sectors of the economy.92  
(b) Provision of Information  
The DFAT online platform gives the public access to a huge amount of 
information on the government’s international investment law policy. It’s 
                                                 
89 See generally DFAT, Public Consultations 
<http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/Pages/public-consultations.aspx> . 
90 Joint Select Committee on Trade and Investment Growth. Inquiry into Business Utilisation 
of Australia’s Free Trade Agreements (2015) 66. 
91 Above  n 88.  
92 Australian Government, ‘A Charter: Economic Diplomacy and Australian Business’, part of 
fact sheet series Australia: Open for business (2014). 
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‘Trade at a glance’ is an interactive website that gives information on all of 
Australia’s top trade and investment partners by imports, exports, goods and 
services.93 There are fact sheets on all of Australia’s trade partners, an 
interactive map showing regional economies and statistics available on 
Australia’s trade and investment flows.94 There are platforms dedicated to 
specific topics, such as foreign investment and ISDS.95 There is also up to date 
information on ongoing negotiations of FTAs with other countries.96 
There are also two regular newsletter services available for free subscription, 
one targeted to business (Business Envoy)97 and one to the general public 
(Tradetalk)98. 
(c) Government-Commissioned Independent Reviews  
The government also commissions independent bodies to undertake reviews of 
its international trade and investment policies. These reviews use public 
submissions and consultations to progress their inquiries. Two of these 
reviews undertaken by the previous Australian Labor Party-led governments 
had a significant impact on governmental policy.  
First, in 2008, the Rudd-led government commissioned Mr David Mortimer 
AO and Dr John Edwards, of the Centre of Economic Development of 
Australia, to conduct a review of Australia’s export policies.99 
                                                 
93 See generally DFAT, Australia’s trade at a glance <http://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/trade-
at-a-glance/Pages/default.aspx>. 
94 See generally DFAT, Trade and economic statistics 
<http://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/trade-statistics/Pages/trade-statistics.aspx>. 
95 See generally DFAT, Trade and investment topics 
<http://dfat.gov.au/trade/topics/Pages/trade-and-investment-topics.aspx>. 
96 See generally DFAT, Status of FTA negotiations 
<http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/Pages/status-of-fta-negotiations.aspx> . 
97 See generally DFAT, Business Envoy<http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-
investment/business-envoy/Pages/business-envoy.aspx>. 
98 See generally DFAT, Trade Talk < http://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/trade-talk/Pages/trade-
talk-e-newsletter.aspx>. 
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In conducting the review, they received 157 submissions and consulted 
directly with 194 stakeholders, from domestic governments to businesses, 
governmental departments, universities and individuals.100   
Of its expansive range of recommendations, the review made particular 
reference to Australia’s need to ‘secure its prosperity in [the] new global 
economy’101 and recommended: 
a) establishing new benchmarks for FTAs; and 
b) reinvigorating Asia Pacific Economic Community trade and investment 
agenda, with the long-term goal of achieving a region-wide FTA.102  
Shortly after this review, the government commenced consultations on the 
TPP and prepared for negotiations, perhaps taking heed of this review’s 
advice.  
Second, in November 2009, the government requested the Productivity 
Commission, an independent government agency, to examine Australia’s 
FTAs and their effectiveness in responding to recent economic and trade 
developments.103 The Commission ‘actively encouraged public participation’ 
and received public submissions, held stakeholder meetings and convened 
various workshops with the stakeholders. As part of its findings of November 
2010, the Commission controversially concluded that ISDS provisions do not 
have a significant impact on investment flows and there are ‘considerable 
financial risks’ emanating from such provisions.104 
 
99 David Mortimer, Winning in World Markets (2008) (‘Mortimer Report’) Appendix A- 
Terms of Reference.  
100 Ibid 166-172. 
101 Ibid 18. 
102 Ibid, key recommendations, 21. 
103 Australian Productivity Commission. Research Report - Bilateral and Regional Trade 
Agreements, (2010) (‘Productivity Commission Report’), iv (‘Terms of Reference’), 1. 
104 Ibid xxxvi (‘chapter 14 findings’). 
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In April 2011, four months following the Commission’s report, the then 
Gillard-led government denounced its use of ISDS in its FTAs and investment 
agreements and made it official policy not to use them.105 The government 
stated that in coming to its position on ISDS, the Commission’s report had 
been ‘closely considered’ and that the new policy was ‘highly consistent’ with 
their recommendations.106 
It is clear that the Commission considered the public submissions in forming 
this position. It makes many references to public submissions and quotes them 
in a number of instances, for example when discussing: 
a) the regulatory chill effect of ISDS;107 
b) the higher level of rights afforded to foreign investors by ISDS 
mechanisms;108 
c) the degree of freedom of arbitral tribunals in ISDS cases;109 
d) the possibility of conflicts of interest and institutional biases in 
arbitration, lack of transparency and the costs incurred;110 and 
e) if Australia should not adopt treaties with ISDS or not.111  
Perhaps critically, it did not rely on any public submission or consultation 
specifically in support of ISDS, stating it: 
received no feedback from Australian businesses or industry associations indicating that 
ISDS provisions were of much value or importance to them. Indeed, as far as the 
Commission is aware, no Australian business has made use of ISDS provisions in 
Australian [FTAs or investment agreements].112 
                                                 
105 DFAT, Trading Our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity April (2011), 14. 
106 Ibid 16. 
107 Ibid 271, referring to submissions of Professor Van Harten and AFTINET.  
108 Ibid 272, referring to AFTINET’s submission.  
109 Ibid 272, referring to Dr Kyla Tienhaara’s submission.  
110 Ibid 273, referring to Dr Kyla Tienhaara’s  and the Law Council of Australia’s 
submissions.  
111 Ibid 276, referring to Aisbett and Bonnitcha’s, Dr Luke Nottage’s and the Law Council of 
Australia’s submissions.  
112 Ibid 270. 
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2 Parliamentary Initiatives  
In addition to being comprised of elected members, the Australian Parliament 
also provides a number of opportunities for further public participation in the 
policy process.  
(a) Parliamentary Committees 
Parliamentary committees are a major participatory component of Australia’s 
legislative arm of government, giving the public an outlet to directly 
participate in the law-making process and help members of parliament access 
a wide range of community and expert views.113  
The role undertaken by the committee depends on the terms of reference 
referred to it by either House of Parliament, Minister or by law.114 This 
reference procedure is said to be a ‘commitment to greater public participation 
with committees as the point of public access’.115  
Upon being referred a matter, the committee advertises the terms of reference 
in the media and invites submissions from the public or any other stakeholder, 
where anyone may lodge a written submission.116 The committee then holds a 
public hearing, with some of those who made submissions being invited to 
give evidence for the committee to clarify the submissions and examine 
opposing views with them.117 Following the hearings and review of all the 
evidence, the committee prepares a report to be presented to Parliament, with 
recommendations for future action. Reports of dissenting committee members 
                                                 
113 John Halligan ‘Parliamentary Committee Roles in Facilitating Public Policy at the 
Commonwealth Level’ (2008) 23.2 Australasian Parliamentary Review 135 (‘Halligan’) 136. 
114 Australian Parliament, About Parliament – Infosheet 4 - Committees  
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of_Representatives/Powers_practice_and_
procedure/00_-_Infosheets/Infosheet_4_-_Committees>.  
115 Uhr above n 5, 129, using ‘Mabo legislation’ as analogy. 
116 Halligan above n 113, 136, 141-2. 
117 Above n 114. 
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are also published. The report, submissions made to the committee and the 
transcript of proceedings are available online.  
The following standing (permanent) and select (temporary) committees have 
played a large part in the participatory functions of the Australian international 
investment law policy process.  
(i) Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 
The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee takes an active role in scrutinising the government’s proposed bills 
and policy in general. In recent years it has undertaken inquiries into each of 
the proposed FTAs with Korea, Japan and China and also undertook an 
inquiry into the Commonwealth’s treaty-making process generally.118  
The committee received 94 submissions and held two days of public hearings 
with witnesses from public authorities, academics, trade unions and NGOs. A 
large number of the submissions were from ‘individuals concerned about the 
secrecy surrounding the negotiations of bilateral and regional FTAs, in 
particular the Trans-Pacific Partnership’119 but also industry bodies, unions, 
academics and other stakeholders. In its report, it found the evidence to be 
‘overwhelmingly critical, and occasionally scathing’ of DFAT’s assertions that 
the current system was sufficient.120  
It concluded that there was ‘no doubt that in respect of the Commonwealth 
treaty-making process there is a groundswell for change’121 and made 10 
recommendations in order to ensure a higher level of consultation and 
information provided before agreements are signed and increase the role of the 
Parliament.122  
                                                 
118 Trade Committee Report above n 35, 2. 
119 Ibid 3. 
120 Ibid 71-73. 
121 Ibid 71. 
122 Ibid; ibid xiii-xiv (‘Recommendations’). 
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(ii) Joint Standing Committee on Treaties 
Since 1996, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties has been appointed at 
the beginning of each Parliamentary term by Resolution of Appointment of the 
two Houses of Parliament jointly. This committee reviews each one of 
Australia’s FTAs that it enters into, together with the National Interest 
Analyses and proposed treaty actions arising from the FTA.123 
(b) Private Members Bills 
Another way the Parliament may play a role in the international investment 
law policy process is through the legislative proposals of non-government 
members; Private Members Bills.124 As they require the majority of the 
members to support them, they rarely crystallise into law, though they are still 
useful as a technique of generating debate on a matter. Two such bills have 
been proposed by non-government members in recent years and have added to 
the public discourse on international investment law policy.  
First, in February 2012, independent Mr Katter introduced a bill to Parliament 
concerning the treaty-making process in Australia generally. This Treaties 
Ratification Bill 2012 contained just one substantive provision, s4: 
                                                 
123 The Resolution of Appointment allows the committee to inquire into and report on: 
‘a) matters arising from treaties and related National Interest Analyses and proposed treaty 
actions and related Explanatory Statements presented or deemed to be presented to the 
Parliament;  
b) any question relating to a treaty or other international instrument, whether or not 
negotiated to completion, referred to the committee by:  
(i) either House of the Parliament, or  
(ii) a Minister; and  
c) such other matters as may be referred to the committee by the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and on such conditions as the Minister may prescribe.’  
See Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Resolution of Appointment 
(1996). 
124 See generally factsheet at Australian Parliament, About Parliament – Infosheet 6 - 
Opportunities for private members 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of_Representatives/Powers_practice_and_ 
procedure/00_-_Infosheets/Infosheet_6_-_Opportunities_for_private_Members>.  
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The Governor-General must not ratify a treaty unless both Houses of the Parliament have, 
by resolution, approved the ratification. 
The bill was referred to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties for 
legislative inquiry, which tabled its report on the bill in Parliament in August 
2012.125 The committee recommended against the bill’s passing, due to the 
practical issues it would cause, that there was no provision for treaties in times 
of emergency and the likelihood of political parties obstructing certain 
treaties.126 It did, however, agree with the member that greater transparency is 
required in the treaty-making process and was ‘disappointed that the process 
has not been pursued’.127 
Second, in March 2014, a Senator of the Australian Greens Party introduced 
the Trade and Foreign Investment (Protecting the Public Interest) Bill 2014. It 
also had just one substantive provision, s3: 
The Commonwealth must not, on or after the commencement of this Act, enter into an 
agreement (however described) with one or more foreign countries that includes an 
investor-state dispute settlement provision. 
The bill was referred to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Legislation Committee for inquiry and report. It received easily the highest 
number of responses of any committee inquiring into an international 
investment law-related bill, receiving 142 written submissions and over 11,000 
emails.128 It held a public hearing on 6 August 2014. 
The majority of submissions supported the purpose of the bill.129 Despite this 
support, however, the committee took greater credence from those submitters 
arguing against the bill, including academics, and also the major Australian 
                                                 
125 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Report 128: Inquiry into 
the Treaties Ratification Bill 2012 (2012). 
126 Ibid 19-22. 
127 Ibid 14. 
128  Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Trade 
and Foreign Investment (Protecting the Public Interest) Bill 2014 (2014) 2. 
129 Ibid 5. 
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companies and businesses in support of ISDS.130 Notwithstanding these bills’ 
failure, they both contributed to the debate on treaty-making process in 
Australia and has been referred to on a number of times since.131  
3 Trans-Pacific Partnership  
Like the TTIP in Europe, the TPP in Australia has garnered a huge amount of 
public debate. When it was concluded and signed on 6 October 2015, there 
were a number of parts that fanned this public debate, including the insertion 
of an ISDS mechanism in the investment chapter.132   
At the time of writing, the TPP was before the legislatures of each party for 
ratification. In Australia, before any binding treaty action is taken, the text and 
a National Interest Analysis like those done for previous FTAs is tabled in 
Parliament. The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties will conduct and 
inquiry and prepare a report for the legislature, which will consider any 
legislative changes necessary for the agreement to be implemented.133  
Public consultations commenced on 3 October 2008 ‘in line with the 
Government’s commitment to ensuring Australia’s trade objectives are 
pursued on the basis of full community consultation’ and would form the basis 
of the government’s priorities and for Australia’s participation in the 
negotiations.134  Initial reports on these concluded that there was ‘widespread 
interest in and support for Australia’s participation in the TPP’.135 In this first 
set of consultations, concerns over ISDS were already articulated.136  
                                                 
130 See for example ibid 13-14. 
131 For example see Trade Committee Report above n 35, 19-20. 
132 See chapter IX of published text, above n 1. 
133 Australian Government, DFAT, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Background 
document: implementation deadline, 24 November 2015. 
134 Hon Simon Crean MP, Priorities and objectives for participation in the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (2008) <http://trademinister.gov.au/speeches/2008/tpp_priorities.html> .  
135 Ibid.  
136 Ibid, stating that ‘some participants cautioned that trade policy not undermine the ability of 
governments to regulate in the public interest and in the interest of protecting the environment. 
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On 20 Nov 2008, the then Trade Minister Simon Crean announced that 
Australia would participate in TPP negotiations and the first round took place 
in March 2010. Between this round and November 2011, there were nine 
negotiating rounds. There are reports made on each round which are published 
online.137 Although these reports outline generally what had been discussed, 
none of them specifically mention ISDS or investment protection.  
In September 2011 and as a result of growing public perception of the 
negotiations being secretive and behind closed doors, the parties publicly 
released the letters to each other setting out the handling of negotiating texts. 
The model letter stated that all negotiating documents were confidential and 
could only be provided to government officials or persons participating in the 
consultation process.138   
Following the 9th round of negotiations in November 2011, the parties’ Trade 
Ministers issued a report on negotiations to date and released a ‘broad 
outlines’ of the agreement, including on an investment chapter. It said: 
Investment. The investment text will provide substantive legal protections for 
investors and investments of each TPP country in the other TPP countries… The 
investment text will include provisions for expeditious, fair, and transparent investor-
State dispute settlement subject to appropriate safeguards, with discussions continuing 
on scope and coverage. The investment text will protect the rights of the TPP 
countries to regulate in the public interest.139 
From December 2011 through August 2013, there were a further ten 
negotiating rounds, all of which were reported online. Each round of 
negotiations included a number of stakeholder events, with ‘Stakeholder 
Forums’ typically being involved, which typically attracted 250 to 300 
 
The CFMEU and AFTINET raised concerns about investor-state dispute settlement and the 
regulation of foreign investment’. 
137 See reports on negotiations listed at DFAT, Trans Pacific Partnership – News 
<http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/news/Pages/news.aspx>. 
138 DFAT, Trans Pacific Partnership – Release of confidentiality letter, 
<http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/news/Pages/release-of-confidentiality-letter.aspx> . 
139 DFAT, Trans Pacific Partnership – Enhancing Trade and Investment, Supporting Jobs, 
Economic Growth and Development: Outlines of The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
<http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/Pages/enhancing-trade-and-investment-supporting-
jobs-economic-growth-and-development-outlines-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership-ag.aspx>.  
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participants. None of these mentioned negotiations on ISDS or investor 
protection. 
From October 2013 there were also a further 12 meetings of the chief 
negotiators and 9 meetings of the Ministers or Leaders of the parties. Like the 
negotiating rounds, each of these meetings are reported online, if brief. None 
of these mentioned negotiations on ISDS or investor protection. 
On 6 October 2015, the TPP was concluded and the government duly 
announced its signing. Trade Minister Andrew Robb announced that a ‘robust 
and modern investor-state dispute settlement mechanism will protect 
Australian investors overseas, as well as the government's right to regulate, 
including on public health.’ 140  
On 9 February 2016, the government tabled the text of the agreement and an 
accompanying National Interest Analysis in Parliament. The analysis reports 
that 83 public submissions were received and 485 stakeholders were consulted 
throughout and following the negotiations.141  
V ASSESSMENT AND COMPARISON OF PARTICIPATION  
The EU’s and Australia’s international investment law policy processes and 
structures are assessed according to their levels of openness, inclusiveness and 
responsiveness; the three sub-principles of participation as laid down by article 
11 of the TEU.  
 Assessment of participation in the EU 
                                                 
140 Press Release, Minister for Trade and Environment, Historic Asia-pacific trade agreement 
opens new era of opportunities (6 October 2015) <http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2015-10-
06/historic-asia-pacific-trade-agreement-opens-new-era-opportunities>.  
141 DFAT, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement between the Government of Australia and the 
Governments of: Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore, the United States of America and Vietnam, National Interest Analysis [2016] 
ATNIA 4, Annexure 1, 2-15. 
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1 Openness  
At the outset, it can be said that the EU is at least aware that its international 
investment policy processes should be more open. This is made clear by 
looking at the contrast in approaches of the Commission, prior to and 
following the 2014 election.  
In relation to the TTIP, prior to the election for example, the then Trade 
Commissioner Karl de Gucht, was pushing the TTIP almost exclusively on the 
back of the advantages offered by it.142 Since then, however, Commissioner 
Malmström has consistently pushed the need for transparency in negotiating it; 
remarking in an official policy document that ‘I’m determined to make these 
the most transparent EU trade talks ever’.143 She has committed to publishing 
more documents on trade and investment negotiations, including the final text 
as agreed.144  
This new approach ties in with the ‘Transparency Initiative’ outlined above, 
which has improved the level of openness in a process that was previously 
seen as secretive and opaque. Since the change of commissioner, there have 
been reports made on the progress of TTIP negotiations following each round.   
The openness of the process is increased further by the workings of the 
Parliament, particularly the INTA committee. By holding its hearing in public, 
together with public workshops and presentations, the public is further able to 
access information on the EU’s progress on international investment law 
policy and its position at the time.  
Finally, the openness is bolstered by the information available on the 
initiatives themselves. The Commission’s online platform ‘Your Voice in 
Europe’ and DG Trade’s online platform ‘Trade Policy and You’ has 
                                                 
142 See generally for example DG Trade, Trade and Investment 2014 (2014). 
143 DG Trade, Inside TTIP: An Overview and Chapter-by-Chapter Guide in Plain English 
(2015). 
144 European Commission, Trade for All - New EU Trade and Investment Strategy (2015) 18-
19. 
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information on consultations, civil society dialogues, publications, events and 
the possibility of a weekly newsletter. There are also separate online platforms 
for the INTA Committee and the European Citizens’ Initiative. These all make 
it far easier for the public to access information on the investment law policy 
process and how they may participate further.  
In relation to the TTIP specifically, there is publicly accessible information on 
the input,145 the process,146 outcome147 and motives148 of the Commission. The 
parameters for openness provided in chapter one, therefore, show a favourable 
assessment.  
(a) Deficiencies   
The glaring omission, is the scarcity of reporting on the progress of the issue 
of ISDS in the TTIP, with reports stating that this issue has not to date been 
addressed. This very question was put to the chief negotiator in the TTIP 
Advisory Group, where he ‘explained that these are market access 
discussions… [and that] there are no ongoing discussions with the US about 
investment protection or ISDS’.149 Given the immense public scrutiny and 
divisive nature surrounding this issue, it is questionable whether the 
Commission is being truly open in its reporting in this respect.  
This view is commonly held. Indeed, over 3.4 million citizens who have 
supported the STOP TTIP citizens’ initiative centre their criticism on how the 
‘democratic dimension of the planned agreement: rules, which have far-
reaching consequences for 500 million EU citizens in 28 member states, are 
                                                 
145 Report on ISDS Consultation above n 54. 
146 See for example European Commission- Directorate- General for Communication, Free 
Trade Is a Source of Economic Growth (2014) 9 (‘How free trade agreements are reached…’). 
147 Concept Paper on TTIP above n 56. 
148 See for example DG Trade, Inside TTIP: An Overview and Chapter-by-Chapter Guide in 
Plain English. (2015) 41-42. 
149 Trade advisory group meeting on 9 October 2015, above n 78.  
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negotiated behind closed doors’,150 and this sentiment was echoed by the 
majority of participants to the Ombudsman’s consultation on the transparency 
of TTIP negotiations. This feeling has not waned since the introduction of the 
new Trade Commissioner’s Transparency Initiative.151  
 
2 Inclusiveness  
The assessment of the inclusiveness turns on whether the participatory 
initiatives are available to general participation and public scrutiny, including 
as wide a cross-section of interests as possible, and avoid the over-influence of 
strong, organised groups.  
In regard to achieving a wide cross section, many of the initiatives put forward 
are open to all EU citizens. The Citizens’ Dialogues are on a ‘first come, first 
served’ basis (in the words of the Commission), public consultations are open 
for anyone online throughout the consultation period, INTA Committee 
hearings are public and these affect the recommendations that it prepares and 
are adopted by the Parliament, any EU Citizen may begin a European 
Citizens’ Initiative or a petition and the information workshops and seminars 
held by DG Trade are open for anyone who can attend.  
There are also ample opportunities for the public to get involved in 
consultations, as they are conducted in various forms by the Commission, 
INTA and the Ombudsman. The TTIP consultation should be lauded as a 
successful initiative in attracting well over 100,000 citizen participants. 
There is also a clear, strong push by the EU to include civil society in the 
process and rightly so, as the ‘primary dimension of citizen involvement 
                                                 
150 Above n 65. 
151 See for example anti-lobbying NGO Corporate Europe at Corporate Europe  
<http://corporateeurope.org/international-trade/2015/05/ttip-talks-despite-pr-still-under-cloak-
secrecy>.  
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through consultations can only be one that is representative’.152 DG Trade’s 
civil society dialogues, consultations and invitations for participation are 
instructive of this. Civil society’s voice as a whole is also strongly represented 
through the EESC, which specifically enjoys a constitutional right to be 
consulted by the EU institutions, and also the TTIP Advisory Group, 
specifically set up to oversee TTIP negotiations. 
(a) Deficiencies  
Despite the ample opportunities, in regard to the Commission’s consultations 
generally, there appears to be a significant lack of representation of the public 
generally. Except for the consultation on the TTIP and ISDS, there was almost 
no citizen participation. In other consultations conducted by the Commission, 
for example, there was only one (or even no) individual public participants.153 
In many cases also, as one commentator found, ‘‘ordinary citizens’ are not 
knowledgeable enough to complete the questionnaires prepared by the 
Commission, especially when a consultation concerns niche areas or technical 
issues.’154  
Further, it has been suggested that individuals prefer to give their opinion in a 
simple way, such as petitions, rather than providing substantive answers 
(which is supported in this case by the strong numbers for the STOP TTIP 
citizens’ initiative). As Marxsen argues, ‘citizens understand that joining 
forces is the way to intervene at the European level much more than providing 
individual, isolated views’.155 Further, although European Citizens’ Initiatives 
                                                 
152 Marxsen above 52, 276. 
153 See results of consultations on the EU’s relations with Japan, Myanmar and Mexico 
available at: DG Trade, Summaries of contributions to the Public Consultation on: ‘The future 
of EU Japan trade and economic relations’, (17 February 2011) 2; European Commission, 
Public consultation on the future investment relationship between the EU and Myanmar 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=176>; European Commission, 
European Commission, Published Results: IASG-EU-Mexico 
<https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/publication/IASG-EU-Mexico>.   
154 Ferri above n 42, 75. 
155 Marxsen above n 52, 272-3. 
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may be initiated by any EU citizen, they still demand significant resources, 
networks, organisation capacity and public relations to pass the initial hurdles 
– perhaps the most demanding of which is needing to obtain 1,000,000 
participants.156 The requirements for being registered are also overly technical 
and provide the Commission too much discretion to reject submitted 
initiatives. This is epitomised in the Commission’s refusal to register the 
STOP TTIP initiative, despite it garnering easily the most participants of any 
of the proposed initiatives to date. Consequently, they are, despite the title, ‘in 
fact not primarily a mechanism for the involvement of individual citizens’.157 
There are also concerns as to the cross-section of civil society being included. 
In regard to the consultations, previous studies have shown generally that 
‘organisations with a business or industry background dominate the 
consultative process’.158 This leaves the level of participation of not-for-profit 
organisations or public interest organisations lacking, where participating at 
the EU level is prohibitively cost intensive.159   
3 Responsiveness 
The responsiveness of the policy process is the most difficult to assess as it is 
difficult to know exactly what the institutions consider, and to what extent, in 
the deciding on the direction of the EU international investment policy.  
Turning to the deficiencies first, on the Europeans Citizens Initiative 
generally, responses by the Commission have been criticised as lacking 
ambition,160 being ‘contrary to the principle of ‘participatory democracy’’161 
                                                 
156 Marxsen above n 14, 166. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Marxsen above n 52, 273. 
159 Ibid; Ferri above n 42, 70. 
160 Right2Water, Press Release Commission Lacks Ambition in Replying to first European 
Citizens’ Initiative, 19 March 2014; discussed in Marxsen above n 14, 167. 
161 One of Us, Press Release from the Executive Board of the European Citizens Initiative, 5 
June 2014; discussed in Marxsen above n 14, 167. 
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and plainly ignoring the requests made by the initiative.162 It has subsequently 
been suggested that ‘unless the Commission finds ways to take the proposals 
more seriously, it is highly unlikely that [they] will play any significant role in 
the future.’163 In the international investment policy realm, it appears to be a 
missed opportunity by the Commission electing not to consider the STOP 
TTIP initiative, if not even in an informal manner, given the wide support that 
it has collected.  
In regard to its response to civil society participation, its involvement in the 
TTIP Advisory Group questions the quality of response it provides. From a 
review of the meeting reports, it does not appear that the group was given any 
substantial information that was not already made public and instead of a two-
way discussion, where the members could influence the direction of 
negotiations, it appeared much more akin to a Q&A session, where the 
members’ views would not likely be taken into account. Likewise, the 
Commission’s response to the Ombudsman’s suggestions regarding 
transparency appeared non-committal and the actual effect of the suggestions 
must therefore be questionable.  
Other mechanisms, such as the EESC have been subject to empirical analyses 
on their effect on decision-making and it is generally agreed that they do have 
an influence, if restricted.164 Specifically on the TTIP, the EESC’s opinion on 
the TTIP discussed above may well have had an impact on the policy stance of 
the EU, as a number of recommendations were adopted by the Commission in 
their negotiating position on ISDS (though these recommendations were not 
particularly unique).165 
                                                 
162 Press Release, Stop Vivisection, ‘A disappointing response’, 5 June 2015 
<http://stopvivisection.eu/en/content/press-releases on 28 December 2015>. 
163 Marxsen above n 14, 168. 
164 Ferri above n 42, 64. 
165 Particularly, the EESC’s call for the Commission to consider the UNCTAD proposals for 
Reform of ISDS were taken up in part. 
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More broadly, there is no part of article 11 of the TEU, nor any other provision 
or regulation, which requires the EU institutions to consider the views put 
forward by the people and civil societies in making its decisions and to what 
extent.166 This allows the Commission to fail to adequately report on the 
outcome of its participatory initiatives, leaving citizens to rely on an 
‘underlying faith that bureaucrats will act in an enlightened manner, seeking 
input from outsiders when appropriate and taking proper account of the 
information received’.167  
(a) TTIP Consultation, Concept paper and Proposed ISDS provisions 
Perhaps the clearest and most positive view of the responsiveness of the EU 
can be found in the Commission’s concept paper and proposed ISDS 
provisions for the TTIP in response to the public consultation on ISDS in the 
TTIP. 
First, the public’s views and suggestions on ISDS in the TTIP were 
summarised and reported in the Commission’s report on the consultation,168 
identifying four prevailing issues of concern arising from the public 
consultation: 
1. the protection of the right to regulate; 
2. the establishment and functioning of arbitral tribunals; 
3. the relationship between domestic judicial systems and ISDS; and 
4. the review of ISDS decisions through an appellate mechanism. 
                                                 
166 Ferri above n 42, 68. 
167 Reeve T Bull  ‘Public Participation and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership’ (2014) 83 George Washington Law Review 1262, 1278. 
168 Report on ISDS Consultation above n 54. 
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Second, these four issues were addressed in the Commission’s concept paper 
and a specific response and suggested negotiating position was given for each 
issue.169 
Third, significantly, each one of these proposed negotiating positions were 
adopted by the Commission in the EU’s proposal for ISDS in the TTIP, which 
was tabled in November 2015.170  
Further, on 29 February 2016, the EU and Canada agreed to amend, among 
others, the ISDS mechanism in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement. These amendments are largely based on the EU’s proposal for 
ISDS in the TTIP.  
It is clear that the Commission has responded to each of the principal concerns 
raised by the public consultation, as each one of them has been specifically 
addressed and then used as a basis for its negotiating position with the US. 
Consequently, it is possible that in this case the views of less than 150,000 
citizens (in a populace of more than half a billion) made a significant and 
direct impact on the international investment policy of the EU; surely a 
sterling example of the responsiveness of participatory democracy in action. 
 Assessment of participation in Australia  
1 Openness  
Australia’s processes are on its face very open. The amount of available 
information on each one of its investment and FTAs is substantial. It provides 
information on the agreement itself, its various trading partners, fact sheets on 
specific topics and a continually updated news service, with two specific trade 
and investment related newsletters.  
                                                 
169 Concept Paper on TTIP above n 56. 
170 European Commission, European Union’s Proposal for Investment Protection and 
Resolution of Investment Disputes in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(2015). 
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Each report undertaken by the parliamentary committees, independently 
commissioned experts or government (DFAT) are all made publicly available, 
together with the submissions made for the purposes of reports, details of 
participants in private consultations and transcripts of public hearings (in the 
case of the committee hearings). 
Where the openness of the process falls down significantly, however, is the 
information provided to the public during negotiations of a given FTA. This 
sentiment has been consistently echoed when discussing the international 
investment law policy process in Australia.  
As the Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee found, the 
principal concern is that the texts of the FTAs are only presented to Parliament 
and the public after they are signed, leaving it with an ‘all-or-nothing’ 
choice,171 being: 
…counter-intuitive for complex trade agreements which are years in the making to 
be negotiated in secret, subject to stakeholder and parliamentary scrutiny for a few 
short months with no realistic capacity for text to be changed, and then for 
implementing legislation to be rushed through parliament unamended. This comes 
very close to making a mockery of the process and of parliament's involvement.172 
For the government’s part, it maintains that the ‘fundamental rationale for [the 
confidentiality] is, if you start releasing your bottom line, your negotiating 
strategy, and everyone can see it, then you are not going to get the best 
outcome’.173  
This contradiction in the views of committees is largely explained by the party 
politics in Australia. As Sawyer states, outcomes of parliamentary committees 
are usually pre-determined by party positions.174 Indeed, since the change of 
government in September 2013, when a committee has recommended 
                                                 
171 Trade Committee Report above n 35, ‘Forward’. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Evidence of Assistant Secretary of DFAT in hearing on treaty making process by Foreign 
Affairs and Trade Committee. See Trade Committee Report above n 35, 43. 
174 Sawyer above n 25, 255. 
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implementing a treaty, it has had more members of the Liberal (governing) 
Party and when it has recommended against implementing it, it has had more 
members of the Labor (opposition) Party or Australian Greens.175  
Example of deficiencies  
The relative lack of openness in FTA negotiations is made no clearer than by 
the conduct of the government throughout its negotiations on the TTP. 
After 9 rounds of negotiations, which were under strict terms of 
confidentiality,176 where apparently investor protection and ISDS in particular 
was not mentioned, or if it was it wasn’t reported publicly, and then after the 
Ministers’ report to the leaders again not mentioning it, the ‘broad outlines’ of 
the agreement stated that the agreement would include ISDS. 
Then following a further ten negotiating rounds and numerous meetings of the 
chief negotiators and the Ministers, all of which were reported online, still 
there was no mention any negotiations on ISDS or investor protection. It was 
not until the TPP was announced on 6 October 2015, over five years after 
negotiations commenced, that an official announcement concerning ISDS in 
the TPP was made.  
Importantly, throughout this period of frequent negotiating and numerous 
meetings, public debate was intensifying, beginning in 2011 with the 
Government’s decision to remove all ISDS provisions in future agreements 
                                                 
175 For example, in the report on Australia’s FTA with China, the Joint Standing Committee 
on Treaties recommended it be passed, but the dissenting reports were all submitted by 
members of the Labor Party. See Report 154: Treaty Tabled on 17 June 2015- Free Trade 
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China (2015), 67 (first sentence), stating that ‘the China-Australia free trade 
agreement (ChAFTA) is an unbalanced agreement as a result of the Coalition government’s 
eagerness to complete the negotiations to an artificial deadline’.  
176 See model letter released by governments, above n 138. 
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(discussed above) and shown in a dramatic rise in media reporting referring to 
ISDS from this period onwards.177 
Yet, despite this boom in public interest and the constant reporting on the 
progress of negotiations, there was no government reporting on this most 
divisive issue. This is a considerable shortcoming in the openness of the 
Australia’s process.   
2 Inclusiveness  
The Australian Government strives to ensure that its processes are available to 
general participation and public scrutiny. Certainly, one of Australia’s 
principal strengths is the continual invitation for submissions and consultations 
from the public. In all of the independently-commissioned reviews, committee 
inquiries and throughout the negotiations, invitations for public submissions 
have been published in the media and online.  
For example, in the case of the inquiry into the Trade and Investment 
(Protecting the Public Interest) Bill the Parliamentary committee received 
over 11,000 emails in support. This process gives the community a chance to 
have input on legislation that affects them and ‘guides’ negotiators throughout 
FTA negotiations.178 As Halligan states, these functions ‘involve the broader 
community in the policy making process, providing a forum for policy debate 
and the committee as an extension of the democratic process that becomes 
thereby more participatory’.179  
As regards consultations, it is clear that attempts are made to gain ongoing 
feedback from stakeholders throughout the government’s negotiations on 
                                                 
177 See table in L Nottage ‘The Evolution of Foreign Investment Regulation, Treaties and 
Investor-State Arbitration in Australia’ University of Sydney; Legal Studies Research Paper 
No 15/97 (2015) 9. 
178 Trade Committee Report above n 35, 16. 
179 Halligan above n 113, 142. 
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FTAs. DFAT estimated that it consulted with more than 1,000 participants 
regarding the TPP.180  
In addition to consultations with stakeholders, the government undertakes 
considerable consultations with experts. This is shown in it commissioning 
experts to undertake a number of lengthy reviews discussed above. Further, in 
addition to informal consultations undertaken by DFAT, the Parliamentary 
committees discussed above all hold public hearings and invite participants 
that have made submissions to the committee to attend to give evidence. These 
hearings result in public reporting, culminating in a higher level of public 
participation than what occurs in the parliamentary chambers. These functions 
therefore provide a formal channel of communication between the public and 
Parliament, encouraging greater community participation.181 
(a) Deficiencies 
Despite these steps taken to include the public in its international investment 
law policy making, there remains a number of deficiencies in Australia’s 
attempt to do so. The principal concern is the lopsided nature of participation 
between stakeholders with business interests against NGOs, not-for-profit 
associations and individuals.  
For example, the numbers that are available on the TPP show that during 
negotiations, submissions to and consultations with government is dominated 
by business, trade associations or unions.182  The level of individual and NGO 
                                                 
180 Trade Committee Report above n 35, 45. 
181 Halligan above n 113, 147-8. 
182 DFAT held consultations with 485 participants, approximately 406 of which were business 
interests, trade associations or unions, 36 with individuals and 16 NGOs. It also received 83 
submissions, approximately 54 of which were from business interests, trade associations or 
unions, 15 from individuals and 5 from NGOs.  
See list of participants in Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement between the Government of Australia and the 
Governments of: Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore, the United States of America and Vietnam: National Interest Analysis [2016] 
ATNIA 4, Annexure 1, 2-15. 
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participants is far lower. Consequently, while it is important for the 
government to access business input to assist it in understanding ‘commercial-
level factors’,183 the cross-section of individuals and civil society being 
included in the process favours the profit-seeking participants with strong 
resources.  
Further, Parliamentary committees are not referred inquiries into any FTAs 
until after they were signed, seriously calling into question the utility of the 
public making submissions and attending hearings into these committee 
inquiries. As the Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee found, 
‘it is pointless for [committee] inquiries to begin after agreements are 
signed’.184 It has also been suggested that the quality of stakeholder 
consultation through treaty negotiations is not as effective as it could be, due 
to the apparent lack of access to documents through the negotiating stage. It is 
said this makes stakeholders having to speculate on the contents of an 
agreement, and compromises the level of expert input available to DFAT. As 
one submitter to the parliamentary committee said, ‘it is nice to have the 
conversation, but it is not a very high value engagement at the moment’.185  
These criticisms have again, however, come from committees with an 
opposition party-majority membership. In other inquiries, the current 
consultation process has been mostly welcomed186 and industry 
representatives are generally satisfied with the current process.187 Further, 
although the committee consultations are conducted after the agreements have 
                                                 
183 Joint Select Committee on Trade and Investment Growth. Inquiry into Business Utilisation 
of Australia’s Free Trade Agreements (2015) 66. 
184 Trade Committee Report above n 35, ‘Forward’. 
185 Ibid 46. 
186 For example, see Joint Select Committee on Trade and Investment Growth. Inquiry into 
Business Utilisation of Australia’s Free Trade Agreements (2015) 66. 
187 See for example, evidence of Export Council of Australia in Trade Committee Report 
above n 35 at 45: ‘We have attended a number of the DFAT consultation sessions and we are 
firmly of the view that they do communicate as extensively as they can and they do take into 
account commentary which is made’. 
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been signed, DFAT consultations and submissions are invited and publicised 
even before negotiations commence. As said by the Joint Standing Committee 
on Treaties, it ‘urges stakeholders to take full advantage of the existing 
opportunities for consultation during the negotiations of bilateral trade 
agreements and to be proactive in putting their case to the negotiators’.188 It is 
perhaps a case of the government showing us the door, but not being able to 
walk us through. 
3 Responsiveness  
The responsiveness of the Australian process is again difficult to assess. 
Certainly, it appears that it relies strongly on expert advice which, in turn, 
considers community views. The previous Gillard-Government responded to 
expert and community concerns that the government’s right to regulate would 
be restricted under ISDS in FTAs. This response is made clear in April 2011, 
four months following the Productivity Commission’s report, when it 
denounced its use of ISDS in its FTAs and investment agreements.  The 
government stated that in coming to its position on ISDS, the Commission’s 
report had been ‘closely considered’ and that the new policy was ‘highly 
consistent’ with their recommendations.  Considering the wide level 
consultation that the Productivity Commission took into account on 
community views, and also that apparently there were no active supporters of 
ISDS in the Commission’s eyes, it is a reasonable conclusion that its 
community consultation played a large part in changing this policy.  
This is also illustrated in its response to the independent review of Australia’s 
export policies. Conducted by economic commercial experts and considering a 
wide range of stakeholder submissions and consultation, among a number of 
core recommendations was that Australia should aim to achieve an Asia-
Pacific region-wide FTA. Just two months following these recommendations, 
                                                 
188 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Report 142: Treaty Tabled on 13 May 2014- Free 
Trade Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of 
Korea (2014) 46. 
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the then Trade Minister announced that Australia would participate in TTP 
negotiations.189  
Nowadays, there is less indication from the government on what has 
influenced its international trade and investment law policy. Perhaps the fact 
that it is difficult to assess is in itself is a mark against the process, as the 
Australian Government has very rarely released much more than cursory 
details of which consultations and submissions it considered in making its 
decisions. The National Interest Analyses, the principal reports prepared by 
the government itself on each FTA following their signing, for example, 
focuses on the arguments for implementing an FTA, but only gives scant detail 
on what impact the stakeholder views had on this decision. In addition, there 
has been no report on the work of the Trade and Investment Policy Council, 
which was specifically set up to facilitate dialogue between the Minister and 
the business community.  
The example of the TTP negotiations again also indicates a poor 
receptiveness to the public input in the process. In the context of wide media 
attention, a Private Members Bill that garnered 11,000 emails in support and 
public recommendations against the adoption of ISDS clauses, the 
government quietly agreed to ISDS in the TPP, albeit with exceptions, with 
so-far very little explanation of how or why it came to this position. If this 
remains the case before the agreement is ratified, it would demonstrate a 
considerable flaw in the participatory democratic process of Australia’s 
international investment law policy. 
 Comparison of both processes 
As against each other, it is first clear that the EU has a higher number of 
participatory initiatives designed to ensure it remains as open as possible. 
                                                 
189 Mortimer Review above n 99 dated 1 September 2008 and the announcement to enter 
negotiations came on 20 November 2009. 
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Certainly, since the change of the DG Trade Commissioner, the Transparency 
Initiative, which aims at enhancing the FTA negotiations as being more 
transparent than ever, has increased the level of information available to the 
public and other stakeholders. This, together with the Transparency Register 
and the constant public appearances of EU officials (through consultations, 
dialogues, debates, INTA hearings and the social networking) on its face 
projects a very open policy process. Australia’s process also appears open, 
with a substantial amount of accessible information on each agreement, 
commissioned report, committee report and public and stakeholder 
submission.  
Despite the appearance of being open, however, both the EU and Australia 
have glaring omissions in what they provide to the public during FTA 
negotiations. This is evident in the negotiations of both of their biggest 
investment-related agreements to date; the TTIP and TTP. Their respective 
positions on ISDS were kept dormant in every one of their negotiating reports. 
This was at a time when ISDS was (and continues to be) the most divisive 
issue surrounding international investment law. The excuse that the issue 
hadn’t been explored yet is not sufficient. 
Notwithstanding this, the EU has recently shown a marked improvement in its 
openness and this is none clearer than in releasing its negotiating position for 
ISDS in November 2015 (before the negotiations have been concluded) and, 
for this reason, it is submitted that its process is more open than Australia’s. 
Second, the EU appears to have more inclusive initiatives, through the sheer 
number of ways that the public and stakeholders may participate. The various 
dialogues, formal online consultations, committee hearings, European Citizens 
Initiative and civil society involvement through the EESC and other formal 
consultations leave the people with ample opportunity to get involved. Despite 
the number, however, these ‘soft mechanisms’ lack proper, wider 
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representation and require a technical knowledge or an abundance of resources 
to fully participate. 
In contrast to the EU, there are no specific, targeted initiatives by the 
Australian government to include the people in the investment law process. 
However, the stakeholders and public are always invited to make submissions 
and contact the relevant institution throughout every stage of the investment 
law policy process; be it during the initial consultations years before 
negotiations commence, continuous informal consultations through 
negotiations, expert consultation on specific industry fields and throughout the 
committee scrutiny of the relevant investment-related agreement. It is true that 
the recent statistics illustrate concerning lopsidedness towards profit-seeking 
associations or businesses, but this is the case in the EU’s consultations as 
well. Further, although the utility of including the public at the committee 
stage after the agreement has already been signed is questionable, the 
culmination of the public’s involvement at every step of the process can only 
have a positive effect on the process more broadly. It is for this reason that 
Australia’s process may be regarded as being more inclusive.  
Finally, it is clear that the EU’s response to the results of a number of its own 
initiatives was little more than indifference, refusing to look at easily the most 
popular European Citizens’ Initiative, denying findings of the Ombudsman 
regarding its transparency and using the TTIP Advisory Group as a Q&A 
session without taking in any recommendations.  
In comparison, the Australian process under the previous government was 
clearly responsive to community and expert concerns about ISDS where it 
changed its policy and, though this has changed to a case-by-case assessment 
of ISDS, its policy still allows for action should attitudes change once again. 
Apart from this response (five years ago), though, there is little to guide us as 
to what the current government considers in forming its policy, which is an 
indictment in itself. The reporting of consultations is scant and the response to 
(2016) 18 UNDALR 
70 
 
committees is heavily influenced by party politics. Generally, it appears that 
Australia places greater credence on expert opinion than it does public 
opinion. 
Conversely, though both processes have their own flaws, the formidable 
illustration of the EU changing its policy on ISDS in the TTIP in response to 
the consultation on this issue is surely an admirable example of ways that 
governments could respond to public participation in this area of law. The 
current EU process, therefore, must be regarded as more responsive.  
VI CONCLUSION 
The EU and Australia were identified as representative democracies that both 
hold closely the principles of participation to fill the gaps where free elections 
alone are insufficient to grant the government legitimacy. These gaps are wide 
in the area of international investment law, as the elected officials play an even 
lesser role in the process than in domestic law-making. As participatory 
democratic theorists in both the EU and Australia have contended, only direct 
civic participation can act as the panacea for these democratic wounds.  
In comparison to one another, it is submitted that Australia’s international 
investment law policy process is more inclusive, but the EU’s is more open 
and responsive to the public and could be used as a starting point for other 
states. Despite this conclusion, however, this comparison has confirmed what 
many have recently articulated more broadly. That is, if their participatory 
processes fill the legitimacy gaps where representative democracy cannot, 
there may lay many more gaps that remain exposed.  
Yet, what stems from this finding? If it is true that the EU’s processes are 
more participatory, it follows that the EU has a higher level of democratic 
legitimacy than Australia. However, it does not necessarily follow that its 
policy and position on investment law is more effective. In regard to the EU, 
which is lambasted on a daily basis for its lack of transparency and public say 
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in its trade and investment policy, it surely is not as technocratic and 
dismissive of the public’s views as is made out. It has just dramatically 
changed its traditional stance on ISDS as a result of public pressure and for 
this, from a democratic perspective, it should be applauded. 
On the part of Australia, which places a higher value on expert consultation, 
there is an argument that this, rather than buckling to populist beliefs, leaves it 
better equipped to efficiently and effectively conclude an FTA which is 
tailored to the specific trade partner. This is seen by its recent promulgation of 
multiple agreements, with many more in the pipeline (including with the EU). 
It is not for this paper to assert that shying away from public participation 
could be advantageous for a government, but if relying on experts more than 
the masses is good enough for Plato,190 there must be merit in the argument. 
Nevertheless, as Australia and the EU continue to rattle through agreements 
that will change the landscape of trade and investment law across multiple 
regions, this comparison has shown that, for two representative democracies 
that would claim to be more participatory than most, neither could be used as a 
perfect model for others in facilitating participation in their international 
investment law policy processes.  
 
                                                 
190 See Plato’s seminal The Republic, recounted in Held above n 3, 23, where Plato likened a 
democracy to a ship, where the captain is unable to sail due to the crew’s attempts to interfere 
and lamenting that a democracy ‘treats all men as equal, whether they are equal or not’. 
